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Veiled memories: an ethnography of the single-party regime
in Turkey
Ramazan Aras
Department of Sociology, Ibn Haldun University, Istanbul, Turkey
When state authorities rule through top-down policies and regulations in order to achieve and
retain their monolithic and elite-driven social-engineering projects, the discontent of ethnic, pol-
itical, ideological and religious groups surges up through political and public mediums. The mod-
ern nation-state’s maneuvers around the controlling of life and death along with its
instrumentalization of miscellaneous forms of violence, terror, and fear have appeared as novel
control mechanisms which constantly shape subjective and collective lives and memories.1
Therefore, studying the state requires comprehensive, broad and deep research to understand it
as a political entity armored with a ‘state of exception’.2 It also necessitates an analysis of the
effects and the encroaching of the state on the everyday lives of ordinary people who are antici-
pated to be obedient citizens. When speaking on the difficulties of studying the state, Philip
Abrams defined the state as ‘not the reality that stands behind the mask of political practice’ but
‘itself as the mask which prevents our seeing political practice as it is’.3 The intricate question of
what the state is, along with ‘the Foucault effect’4 in the social sciences and humanities in the
1990s, has resulted in the growth of ethnographic and theoretical studies addressing diverse
forms and practices of the state.5 The literature on state formation, power and its diverse ideo-
logical, physical and psychological apparatuses along with novel ruling mechanisms have bur-
geoned in spite of ‘practical and conceptual difficulties’.6 Therefore, going beyond the ambiguity
and elusiveness of the subject matter, this article emphasizes the difficulties of studying diverse
mechanisms of the modern authoritarian secular state as a political body and as an ethnographic
site.
The ultimate task of this work is to document difficulties of investigating the effects of the
authoritarian secular Turkish nation-state and its apparatuses on social fabric and memory. As an
anthropological and oral history study of everyday practices of authoritarian and ‘assertive’7 secu-
larism during the single-party regime era in Turkey (1923–1950), this paper emphasizes the
importance of the life stories and personal testimonies of ordinary citizens who witnessed this
era.8 Firstly, it should be noted at the beginning that an analytical study of relations between
the state and society with a particular focus on precarious times, breaking points, times of tur-
moil (coups d’etat) and internal political clashes in the history of the country has been a puz-
zling, fearsome and intimidating task for social scientists with a critical perspective. Secondly, the
‘statist’ formation of social sciences and academic institutions in Turkey has also prevented crit-
ical and independent approaches that attempted to go beyond ideological boundaries dictated
by Kemalist ideology. Researchers who questioned the official historiography and the statist
ideologies struggled within the mainstream Kemalist and Turkish nationalist body of the acad-
emy in Turkey and have been cast out in one way or another for a significant period of time.
Consequently, it can be argued that one of the reasons behind the late arrival of critical ethno-
graphic studies in academia regarding the formation of the Turkish state, with a particular focus
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on the era of the single-party regime, was the statist and Kemalist formation of social sciences in
the country. For instance, in the case of the late emergence of socio-cultural anthropological
studies in Turkey, Tayfun Atay has argued that anthropological research conducted in the 1920s
held a particular focus on physical anthropology, and was ignored in the 1940s because of the
political interests of the Kemalist state.9 Similarly, in this context it has been argued that
‘anthropology played a crucial role in the ideological formation of the Republic’ during its
early decades.10
Despite these challenges, critical and independent studies of oral history and social memory
began to emerge in the 1990s at some private and a very few state universities and institutions
under the guidance of particular institutions11 and scholars.12 Despite limited sources and a lack
of institutional development, oral history studies grew at the beginning of the 2000s. The expan-
sion of literature and rising awareness of the oral histories of various ethnic and religious com-
munities, ideological/political groups and movements either complemented or encountered
official histories and narratives; these could be related to Turkey’s move and will towards a more
democratic state in those years. In the developing literature of oral history and memory studies
in Turkey of the same period, researchers focused largely on certain aspects of non-Turkish eth-
nic societies (Kurdish, Greek, Armenian, Assyrian, Laz, and Circassian), non-Muslim communities
(Christian, Jewish, Yezidi), non-Sunni (Alevi) subjects and communities, the events during and
after the First World War, the Sheikh Said Rebellion of 1925, the Dersim massacre of 1937–1938,
the histories and memories of the coups d’etat of 1960, 1971 and 1980, and both the Armenian
and Kurdish Questions in contemporary Turkey.13
While describing the fundamental and traumatic events of the modern history of Turkey in
the context of the development of oral history and memory studies in Turkey, the crucial ques-
tion of ‘how do we remember?’ is highlighted by Leyla Neyzi.14 However, the answers to this
question and to the question of ‘What do we remember?’ for the majority of the Muslim popula-
tion disclose some crucial but neglected aspects of the history of the secular Republic. The ques-
tion of what we know about the oral histories and memories of ordinary citizens who survived
atrocities of the single-party regime and the ‘work of postmemory’15 in the following generations
still remains to be answered properly. What were the survival tactics of these subjects under
enduring, decades-long effects of sweeping and enforced secularization/westernization rules and
principles in the official and the public realm? Here, I argue that the rule of the single-party
regime that deeply influenced the larger Muslim public has not been treated, addressed and
documented accurately or sufficiently in the existing literature. It seems the suffering of the
mainstream Muslim population has been trivialized. There has been a resounding silence during
which painful memories of that era have been veiled and very partially revealed for various polit-
ical reasons. It appears that historians of modern Turkey, oral historians and other researchers
have been complicit in ignoring histories and memories of Muslim subjects of that era and thus
generating a crucial gap in the history of modern Turkey. Therefore, doing an ethnography of
the Kemalist single-party regime not only requires a critical reading of the statist narratives but
also identifying comprehensive methodological strategies to overcome longstanding measures
hindering access to both veiled personal memories and relevant data in the official archives.
During the work of carrying out an ethnography of the single-party regime and its assertive
secular politics, the first challenging issue facing ethnographer and his/her interlocutors was
fear of the state because they were concerned about security as widely seen in conflict and
post-conflict research settings. It is argued here that people’s conception of the state as a hege-
monic and violent entity resulted in anxiety in the interviews during the fieldwork. The second
issue was the politics of remembering and forgetting among people who have to confront
diverse reasons, motives and issues alongside ageing. Third, state-legislated protective laws as in
the case of the law of lese-majeste for Mustafa Kemal Atat€urk (1881–1938) have fabricated a per-
ception of him as an infallible, glorious and sacred figure. This Kemalist narrative of the status of
Mustafa Kemal has been largely equated with a sense of belonging and loyalty to the homeland,
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the state. Lastly, the state policies of censorship and non-accessibility of certain archival records
relating to the single-party regime era need to be highlighted as methodological difficulties con-
fronting anyone who wants to study the state. In oral history studies, it is generally articulated
that the subject matter consists of unwritten histories and memories have consciously or uncon-
sciously been ignored by hegemonic discourses and historiographies. Therefore, this article is not
only about those neglected histories and memories or ‘missing archives’16 in the mainstream his-
toriography but also the failure of researchers working on the history of modern Turkey and oral
historians themselves.
The secular state and its Muslim subjects
Following the declaration of the foundation of the new state in 1923, the Kemalist moderniza-
tion/westernization project that transformed the state rationale and apparatus launched a rigid
secularization process to uproot diverse traditional and Islamic institutions, norms, codes and
patterns of life. The unfolding policies of authoritarian secularization reflected a deep sense of
anti-religiosity (anti-Islam) in favor of modernity/westernization along with Turkish nationalism
which was equated with the idea of the supremacy of Turkishness. Based on a new paradigm,
secularism was coupled with evolutionism/positivism, and Turkish nationalism which became the
master signifiers and discourses of the Turkish territorial state. The move towards construction of
an ‘imagined community/nation’ necessitated fundamental changes in essential ‘cultural concep-
tions’.17 The Kemalist ideology which was defined by Taha Parla and Andrew Davison as a
‘nationalist, laicist and solidarist corporatism’18 was based on ‘the conviction that the Kemalist
elite were distinct from the Anatolian masses in terms of rational intelligence and adaptability,
and were therefore responsible for leading Anatolian townsmen and peasants out of darkness
into the light’.19
Hence Islamic institutions and cultural forms were replaced with new modern institutions,
narratives of a western, evolutionary and secular narrative genres, symbols and codes that
were imbued with quasi-sacred qualities. In this context, the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924
was the starting point for a wider political, religious and cultural rupture. The declaration of
the closure of Islamic schools (479 madrasas) in 1924,20 was followed by the hat (şapka) law to
impose western secular dress codes, prohibition of the burqa (in Turkish çarşaf) and fez
(Ottoman tarboosh), and the closure of religious (Sufi) orders and lodges in 1925. The elimin-
ation of the Arabic alphabet and introduction of the Latin alphabet in 1928 was a sign of start-
ing a new era. The abolition of Islamic sharia law in 1934 was followed by other new rules and
regulations related to law, education, religion and other social and political institutions. In
other words, the authoritarian secular regime’s radical regulations that aimed to control social,
cultural and religious patterns of life were expanded to acceptance of European civil, commer-
cial and penal codes, Turkification (conversion from Arabic to Turkish) of the call to prayer
(ezan)21 and sermons (Friday prayer, hutbe), and prohibition of the teaching and learning of
the Quran and Arabic.22
These forcefully imposed secular rules and regulations resulted in destructive and traumatic
effects on the social body in spite of mass discontent among the population. For instance, the
declaration of Tevhid-i Tedrisat Law (Unity of Education) on 3 March 1924 resulted in the pro-
hibition of the Arabic alphabet, used for centuries, and with being replaced by the Latin alpha-
bet under 1353 numbered law on 1 November 1928. On this date, state authorities began a
highly pervasive control of public and private spaces by employing the police and the army.
Around four year later, on 4 January 1932, the state declared a new law in article 526 of the
Turkish Penalty Law, stating that ‘those who teach and educate using the Arabic alphabet in
public and private places (homes included) will be subject to incarceration for at least three
months or made to pay a fee ranging from 10 to 200 Turkish Liras’.23 Furthermore, ‘the hat
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law’ that was passed by the Turkish parliament on 25 November 1925 prohibited men from
wearing other turbans and promoted the wearing of western hats by all male citizens across
the country.24
With the legislation of the Takrir-i S€ukun Law (the Law for the Maintenance of Order), one inde-
pendence tribunal was established in Ankara (Ankara Istiklal Mahkemesi) and the Eastern
Independence Tribunal (Şark _Istiklal Mahkemesi) was established on 5 April 1925. The one founded in
the Diyarbakır started work just after the Sheikh Said rebellion in order to eliminate Kurdish oppos-
itional voices. However, interestingly, these tribunals acted in a mobile capacity, moving to many
other cities from 1925 to 1927 to eliminate any oppositional figures and movements who opposed
the secular regulations and were not willing to obey the new laws.25 In this process of suffocating the
voices of mass populations, Eric J. Z€urcher claims that ‘the Independence Tribunals played their part
in suppressing this resistance. Under the Law on the Maintenance of Order nearly 7500 people were
arrested and 660 were executed’.26 Both statist and counter-statist written sources on the history of
the Atat€urk era document varying numbers of charged and executed Muslim subjects who opposed
the authoritarian secular practices. It is not easy to get a totally accurate number of executions and
diverse charges. For instance, Erg€un Aybars documents that from just 1 December 1925 to 23
February 1926, 3500 people were dragged into the courts, 1368 of whom were not found guilty, 678
were punished and 156 of these were executed.27 The map below indicates not only the major cities
where these independence tribunals were operating but also other cities where a ‘mobile’ independ-
ence tribunal carried out hundreds of executions, incarcerations and other forms of punishment
against ordinary Muslim citizens who opposed the hat law and other authoritarian Kemalist secular
principles (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Some of the major cities where Independence Tribunals operated from 1925 to 1927. The list of the cities was
mainly derived from the work of Kemalist historian Erg€un Aybars on the Independence Tribunals.76 (Map: Courtesy of the
University of Texas Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin: https://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/tur-
key_admin_2006.jpg).
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The map above illustrates how the Independence tribunals worked systematically as fearsome
machines and how they disseminated a fear of terror and death in many cities. The authoritarian
secular regime aimed to achieve a submissive citizenry all around the country by creating a climate
of fear of the state within the national boundaries. For instance, 47 people were executed in
Diyarbakır including Sheik Said in 1925,28 and 10 people were executed in Elazıg in 1926.29 As
stated earlier, the executions were carried out in many cities where thousands of Muslim subjects
were reacting against the state-sponsored authoritarian secular regulations. In Rize, 143 people
were dragged into the independence tribunal in 1925 for opposing the hat law. The court made
its decision on 14 December when eight people were sentenced to capital punishment, 14 were
given 15years in prison, 22 people were given 10years, and 19 of them were given 5 years. Eighty
were not found guilty.30 In another case, on 21 December 1925, 45 people were arrested in Maraş
because of their opposition to the hat law and were sent to Ankara to be tried at the Ankara
Independence Tribunal. The decision was made on 18 January 1926 and seven of these people
were sentenced to capital punishment. The others were sentenced in various ways including
imprisonment.31 Another source documents that thirty Muslims in the city of Erzurum, including
one woman, were executed by independence tribunals.32 It is not possible to document hundreds
of other court cases in various cities and counties where thousands of people were executed,
incarcerated or given other forms of punishments here because of the space constraints of this art-
icle. In short, for the Kemalist totalitarian secular state authorities, ‘backward’ opponent Muslims
(gericiler, yobazlar) were a threat to the sovereignty of the newly founded state and therefore had
to be eliminated by any means necessary. In this context, it can be argued that the independence
tribunals achieved their ultimate goal and suffocated the voices of discontented citizens. That is
why statist and Kemalist historians and researchers such as Erg€un Aybars consider the destructive
operations of independence tribunals, which continued for two years, to be an essential step and
as a crucial period that facilitated the foundation of the Turkish Revolution (T€urk Devrimi).33
Mustafa Kemal’s successor _Ismet _In€on€u (1884–1973) who later named himself National Chief (Milli
Şef) and the greatest guardian of Kemalist ideals, was a very strong supporter of Kemalist principles
and exerted huge efforts in disseminating and maintaining Kemalist ideology around the country
until the Republican People’s Party (RPP) lost power in the 1950 elections.34
In his work on the single-party regime in Turkey, Gavin Brockett contends that ‘histories of the
Turkish Revolution must be treated with considerable circumspection not simply because their
sources are explicitly biased in Kemalist interpretation of political developments, but also because
the same sources present an extremely distorted impression of popular Turkish experience’.35 In
this context, oral history methodology helps us to uncover untold stories and testimonies and how
Kemalist principles and re-coding policies were domesticated into the social and cultural fabrics of
Muslim society by force and diverse forms of state-sponsored violence. As one of the historians
working on early Republican history, Hale Yılmaz claims to document ‘how ordinary people experi-
ence the process of Kemalist reforms and how they receive and react to the state-initiated
changes’36 in the introduction of her work. By using both archival and oral sources, she aims ‘to
shift the emphasis away from the state and leaders to the society in order to understand the peo-
ple’s own experiences of the process of nationalist reforms’.37 However, Yılmaz fails to reveal a
clear and complete picture of the feelings, reactions and resistance of ordinary people who disap-
proved of the Kemalist top-down secular principles and new rules. Yılmaz’s narrative is primarily
based on the Turkish-populated parts of the country and does not provide any data from Kurdish
inhabited parts of the country and how ordinary Kurds perceived and reacted to the Kemalist
reforms. While barely addressing the perceptions and reactions of larger Muslim populations and
generally avoiding burning questions, she prefers to highlight the experiences of local state gover-
nors, local representatives, teachers, soldiers and marginal pragmatic bureaucrats and businessmen
from different parts of the country. Like many other researchers working on this era, Yılmaz also
reproduces the Kemalist and statist discourses and does not allow us to see a more comprehensive
picture of the era despite her ability and access to the archival and oral data on that period.
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Rather than focusing on the ‘weapons of the weak’38 and voices of marginalized mass populations
in the country, Yılmaz mostly documents the experiences of Kemalist elites, pragmatist reformists,
opportunist figures and those public figures and officials who were forced to follow rules in differ-
ent institutions and settlements around the country. In fact, any critical research based on the oral
accounts and personal testimonies of ordinary people that survived the single party regime along
with state archives and other written sources can provide us with a better understanding of this
critical historical period that shadowed and shaped the modern history of Turkey.
During the work of going beyond the statist historiography and recording counter-narratives,
the task of collecting life stories and personal memories holds its own methodological complex-
ities during which a researcher or ethnographer must sometimes go beyond the voice. In this
context, material and cultural artifacts, names of people and settlements and the human bodies
can be analyzed as texts in order to glean some signs of the events of a particular past. While
writing on the effects of the alphabet ‘revolution’ in 1928, Irvin Cemil Schick documents how
Ottoman calligraphers (hat ustası) were outlawed by the new law and how they struggled to
find a means to survive in the following years that ended in their disappearance and the near
perishing of their craft. Through his analysis of their life stories and memories, he talks about
how their physical bodies carry the memories of that art, bodily memory; both their bodies and
art have become ‘loci of memories’. By recalling Pierre Nora’s eminent work and his notion of
homme-memoire,39 Schick describes the last generation of these calligraphers as ‘memory men’40
and indicated how memories are forced to become invisible or move to suppressed spaces
when encountering threat and terror.
Schick then describes the last generation of calligraphers who struggled to maintain memo-
ries of this art in the Latinized Republican era as ‘book people’,41 echoing the book protectors in
the science-fiction novel Fahrenheit 451 by Ray Bradbury.42 Interestingly, the acts of memorizing
books as a tactic of protection and survival can be similarly seen during the single-party regime
era. As we learn from the oral accounts, after the ban, studying and memorizing the Quran
secretly intensified, particularly in the forest villages of the Eastern Black Sea region. The same
tactic was mostly secretly practiced by pious Muslims in the following decades. This has played a
great role in the survival and empowerment of that Islamic tradition. Totalitarianism as a new
rule of the Turkish state gained large ground not only in state institutions but also in the public
space and in the domain of everyday life during that era. The book burnings in Bradbury’s
haunting novel as a science-fiction scenario in the early 1950s was an actual experience at differ-
ent times throughout the world, but also in Turkey during the 1930s. As we learn from oral
accounts, Arabic books including chapters (nushas) of Qurans were systematically forbidden, col-
lected and burned in almost every city after the ban on the Arabic alphabet in 1928.
The climate of fear and precarity
In their pioneering work on the state, James Ferguson and Akhil Gupta use the concepts of
‘verticality’ and ‘encompassment’ (vertical encompassment) in order to explain pervasive, central,
top down, manipulative and surrounding authorities of the state.43 During the formation of such
authoritarian regimes, the emotions of fear, death and security have always been used by state
actors as very effective instruments of disciplining and control of the masses. In a similar vein,
our recently conducted oral history project documented how the emotions of fear, death and
suffering were dominant in everyday life and how they were attached to the state, the single-
party regime, and its local agents and apparatuses by the ordinary Turkish citizens. The oral
accounts of ordinary people have revealed the conception of the state as an omnipresent and
fearsome entity.
During the fieldwork, we witnessed a continuation of that deep fear and anxiety on the faces
and in the eyes of our many interlocutors. While some cancelled the interviews, others started to
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tremble, gulp, and sometimes cry during the interviews. I remember quavering voices, hidden
looks and moments of bitter silence, in addition to the cancellation of further interview appoint-
ments. These emotions have served as repeated and powerful signifiers of feeling of insecurity
and effective registers in their worlds.44 The most striking experience in the field was to observe
such insecurities and prolonged traumas while trying to convince and encourage these forgotten
victims who are now in their nineties to share their stories. How should we understand these
emotions of fear of the state and that deep pain that have lingered in the hearts and minds of
ordinary people for so many decades? How do we interpret the well-known Turkish proverb,
keser d€oner sap d€oner, g€un gelir hesap d€oner (what goes around comes around) which was
expressed by many elders who were reluctant to talk and those who cancelled interviews?45 In
spite of the fact that Turkey has been governed by a popular conservative government, the AK
Party (Justice and Development Party), in the nearly two decades since 2002, it did not facilitate
the process of conducting more research among those citizens and give them a voice. The proverb
can be interpreted as a manifestation of their anxiety, mistrust and hesitance if asked to speak
about the single-party regime era, addressing Mustafa Kemal era in particular. That is why many
interlocutors blamed and consciously addressed ‘Halk Partisi’ (Republican People’s Party) rather
than its founding leader while talking about atrocities and state violence. They felt more comfort-
able talking about and criticizing _Ismet _In€on€u, Mustafa Kemal’s successor. On the other hand,
some of them expressed their feelings during the interviews by saying Allah bir daha Halk Partisini
başımıza getirmesin (May Allah never allow the RPP to gain power again). This statement was con-
stantly repeated by many elderly interlocutors. It has been observed that people are still afraid of
a possible resurrection of the authoritarian Kemalist secular regime, which can be described as a
form of ‘hauntology’.46 The fact that the state or army-sponsored coups d’etat and other military
interventions occurred in the country in almost every decade further fostered that perception and
deepened that fear. The perception of the Turkish state as a ghostly entity had a devastating
impact on their everyday life which was dominated by precariousness for decades.
Fear of the state as a destructive, intimidating and insidious emotion was widely experienced
and felt by citizens of the newly established territorial Kemalist Turkish state not only at the time
but also lingers in people’s minds and hearts in the present. While analyzing life stories and testi-
monies of our male and female interlocutors, the dominance of emotions and narratives of fear
of the state, incarceration, punishment and execution can be explicitly seen. During the field-
work, some elders rejected appointments outright or later cancelled them or kept silent while
being asked for details such as specific names and periods. The main reason behind this deep
and haunting fear and silence among elders is the fact that any individual or collective acts of
suppressed social agents against the secular policies mentioned above were brutally punished
during that era. On the other hand, those who were willing to speak and tell their life stories
and testimonies narrated many stories of executions, punishments, incarcerations, interrogations
by police or soldiers. In spite of the fact that my own interlocutors and other elders who were
interviewed by our research assistants were from different cities in different regions of the coun-
try, the similarity of events, experiences and atrocities they narrated indicate wide-spread practi-
ces of the state in different parts of the country.
Ayşe who was in her eighties and from the city of Rize, conveyed how her father was incar-
cerated in the 1930s for four years due to his opposition to wearing a western hat and for speak-
ing out against it in the mosque during Friday prayers.47 She remembers how her mother
regularly visited her father in prison. As in the case of Ayşe, children of that era not only remem-
ber with fear and anxiety what happened to them but also what happened to their parents and
other elders as well.
In their life stories and narratives, the majority of the interlocutors talked about how they ‘secretly’
tried to learn the Quran during their childhood in barns or secret houses in the forest despite a deep
fear of being arrested by the police or soldiers. Hamide who was born in 1940 remembers how previ-
ous generations talked with deep sorrow about their many escapes from the gendarmerie who raided
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not only the mosques but also secretly situated places (barns, basements, houses, cottages and gar-
dens) where they were learning to read the Quran. The state gendarmerie forces perceived as actual
agents of fear of the state were persistently remembered with their actions of raids and house
searches. Not only Hamide but the majority of my interlocutors named the single-party regime era as
‘_In€on€u d€onemi’ (the Era of _In€on€u)48 or ‘Halk Partisi D€onemi’ (the Era of the People’s Party) and remem-
bered this period with that deep fear. Hamide who was in her late seventies recounted:
Imam (hoca) was teaching us how to read the Quran which was forbidden in those years. According to
testimonies of our previous generation, while hearing about the raid of the gendarmerie, children escaped
to the forest and gardens. They were escaping…While escaping they dropped their elifbas (booklet of
instruction in the Arabic Alphabet), Quran chapters and Qurans. As the children ran away through gardens,
sometimes the spines of the books fell apart. One by one the leaflets fell out and pages were getting
hooked onto the branches of the hazelnut trees and tearing up the pages… Many have told these kinds of
stories. My sister in-law has also recounted them. The Quran was forbidden… Some could manage to learn
the Quran but some could not… Many could not learn… 49
As Paul Connerton has eloquently stated, ‘the attempt to break definitely with an older social
order encounters a kind of historical deposit and threatens to founder upon it. The more total
the aspirations of the new regime, the more imperiously will it seek to introduce an era of forced
forgetting’.50 During and after the era of the single-party regime in Turkey as an era of forced for-
getting, ‘veiled or hidden memories’ demand a deliberate act of ‘remembering’ as a tactic of
resistance and as ‘a ground of political struggle’ against the power of the secular state.51 One of
the key interviewees narrated how Arabic books and texts including Qurans were collected from
houses by soldiers and burned in the yard of local government offices. In Istanbul, 98-year-old
Zeynelabidin narrated his memories of systematic incidents of the burning of books written in
Arabic including Qurans in Gaziantep in the 1930s:
I was eight or ten years old. My father was serving tea from our teahouse to the state officials in the
Government Center building in Antep. I was helping him. One day, as usual, my father told me to serve coffee
to one of the chiefs there. While walking through the yard I saw soldiers and a huge stack of books written in
Arabic, lots of noble Qurans, booklets of the sura of Yasin, and many others. Four armed soldiers were keeping
watch over them. Then, they started to pour gasoline (kerosene) on them and burn them. It was the back yard
of the grand penal court. Immediately, I approached the soldiers and asked them to let me pick some of the
Qurans. They let me but pretended that they do not see me while I was taking them. I picked three Qurans
whose edges were burned a little bit but where the fire had not reached the verses. I hid them in the coal-
bunker until the evening and then took them home. After a while, I remember, my father was scared that the
soldiers might see them during house searches and therefore discreetly left each one in nearby mosques.52
While narrating this story, Zeynelabidin started to cry and curse the state authorities of the
time. After calming down, he continued:
Oh, my son, the police and gendarmerie were searching houses in the cities, towns and villages, one by
one and collecting the Qurans. During their house raids, local headmen (muhtarlar) guided and helped
them. They were collecting Qurans and all other religious books in Arabic and carrying them in big gunny
bags and then burning them.53
The life stories and narratives of first- and second-generation survivors of the single-party
regime document many accounts of rescuing or hiding religious books, the struggle of families
attempting to teach and help their children with memorizing the Quran. In the village of
Muratbey in the mountainous region in D€uzce, Hafız _Ismail, who was nearly eighty years old, nar-
rated how it was difficult to learn and memorize the Quran in those years. When I asked about
the ban, he hesitated and replied ‘There was a ban. Gendarmeries were coming. I do not want
to talk about this…’ Then, when I insisted he started to talk. In his words,
Actually, I have told these stories to my children as well. Excuse me, but they (gendarmeries) were throwing
Qurans into the toilets and burning them. While we were learning at the house of the Imam, the watcher
would scream to us that the gendarmeries are coming. It was generally around ten o’clock and we were in
the middle of our class. Then, all kids were escaping. We ran to our houses, of course. Nobody was doing
anything when the gendarmerie was in the village. What can you do? The gendarmerie was the
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state… They could arrest you… There was nothing to do… When the gendarmerie left the village, we
collected the Qurans from the toilets. Some parts of them were burned. I remember, my father told me to
burn or bury those Qurans under a fruit tree. Somewhere where people could not step on them… 54
These stories and memories of survivors completely challenge the official narrative of what
took place in the early decades of the Republic. Hafız _Ismail also narrated how his father rejected
and never wore the hat. However, he talked about how he bought one from the seller in front
of the mosque in D€uzce and wore it sometimes. He added: ‘I wore it but I had Muslim faith in
my heart. You should look at one’s heart not the hat. But, if you wear it you do not become an
infidel (gavur)…’.55 Hafız _Ismail and other interviewees also relate accounts of religious Muslim
women clad in burqas and their inability to visit town or city centers for months and years due
to the ban on the burqa and hijab. Publicly circulated actual stories and rumors about women
whose burqas and hijabs were torn apart by the police or soldiers intimidated them into not
going to public spaces displaying an Islamic dress code.
The use of fear and violence as two governing mechanisms by the single-party regime turned
these phenomena into highly influential registers of everyday life where precarity became one of
the foremost prevailing emotions in the life of Muslim subjects. The traumatic impact of diverse
forms of state violence, punishment and severe secularization policies during the single party
regime were felt in the following generations as a result of the dominant role of the Turkish
army in determining the politics in the country. The army which has been staging coups d’etat
decennially has played the role of guarantor of the secular Kemalist regime as well. In the pro-
cess of secularization and Turkification for establishing a fully homogenized Turkish nation not
only Muslim Turkish subjects but also other ethnic communities and non-Muslim groups were
targeted. In short, one of the fundamental tasks of the secular nation-state was to discipline and
civilize the backward religious and non-Turkish masses by establishing an efficient schooling sys-
tem and various other institutions.
The politics of remembering and forgetting: insecurity and ageing
Doing ethnographic research on the impacts of the state, state-community relations and politic-
ally marginalized religious and ethnic communities in Turkey with a critical perspective has been
a very challenging task for many researchers.56 In other words, collecting data in insecure envi-
ronments and whilst risking the lives of both the researcher and interlocutors was not an easily
achievable task in the context of carrying out research in conflict and post-conflict environ-
ments.57 Questions like ‘Why do people conceal their memories? Why it is difficult to narrate
events from the past? What is the conception of the state as a hegemonic power amongst ordin-
ary people in Turkey?’ were the main questions and concerns that pushed individuals to develop
or resort to a certain politics of remembering without abandoning the need to secure them-
selves and their family members. Emotions of fear of the state and anxiety seemed to be
amongst the strongest determinants in the politics of remembering and forgetting during inter-
views, as well as in casual talks with our interlocutors in our project. Field observations and the
narratives of our interlocutors have revealed the fact that there is a continuity of these emotions
in the hearts and minds of people from different generations and from diverse ethnic, ideo-
logical and class backgrounds. In addition to this, the fact that the target informant figures for
our project were above the age of eighty resulted in a difficult encounter with gathering stories
from elders, most of whom struggled with ageing and, at times, with Alzheimer’s disease.
During my fieldwork in the village of Fakıllı near the city of D€uzce, I attempted to convince
89-year-old Arif Badur, a friend’s grandfather, to recall the era of the single-party regime. In spite
of the fact that I was introduced to him through his grandchild who reiterated words of trust
and comfort, he was still not willing to speak. Instead, the elderly man opted to interrogate me,
questioning who I was, why I was doing this research, whether I was a spy or even a police
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informant, and whether I was pro-government or not. In the end, he reluctantly offered a highly
filtered account of that past with obvious signs of nervousness, whereas his wife Fatma was
slightly more willing to share her memories.58 Fatma narrated how dangerous it was to study
the Quran in those years due to sudden raids by police and soldiers who received reports from
local informants and state-collaborators (Kemalist school teachers, headmen, and other state offi-
cials, supporters of the RPP among local people). 84-year-old Fatma narrated one of her own sto-
ries from the early 1940s:
I remember, while going to primary school I was also trying to learn reading the Quran in the village, at the
imam’s home. I generally went on Saturdays and Sundays for the Quran lessons. Sometimes I would go in
the early morning during the weekdays as well and then go to school. However, sometimes, I would arrive
late at the school while I was taking Quran classes. Once, the teacher asked me why I took Quran classes.
He wanted to punish me. He asked me to extend and open my hands. My response was no. He was going
to beat my hands with a cornelian cherry branch. I refused but he still beat my hands with that stick and
shouted at me to not take Quran classes anymore… Then, I guess, the imam was reported. On the
weekend, I went again as usual. Whilst in class, one of the kids had stayed outside to watch in order to
warn the imam if state officials or raid patrols were coming. While studying, suddenly, the watcher kid came
in and warned the imam that the soldiers were approaching. The imam and his wife ushered us out in
panic and hid us in the barn. They hid the rahles (Quran desks) and Qurans in the hayloft. I was watching
from the cracks of the barn’s wooden door. Soldiers came in and talked to the imam: ‘They say you are
teaching the Quran here. Is that true?’ The imam replied: ‘No, there must be a mistake or misinformation.
We do not do this here. You are welcome to check around.’ The soldiers then talked to one other and said,
‘It must be a misreport,’ and left. Following this event, the imam and his wife fled the village in fear in the
following days.59
One of the strong discourses in the narratives of my interlocutors was the constantly repeated
phrase, Allah, bir daha o g€unleri bize g€ostermesin (May Allah never let us see or experience those
days, again). These kinds of constantly repeated prayers can be interpreted as strong indications
of trauma and fear that were experienced and whose effects still linger in their lives. This is why
the top-down policies of the Turkish state are being remembered with the distinct image and
perception of the state having an ‘iron fist’. The image remained unchanged and was observed
and experienced intermittently in later periods which were encircled with four coups d’etat,
1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997 respectively.60 As a result, the violent, manipulative and intrusive
character of the state and its practices resulted in the emergence of insecure and suspicious rela-
tions between the authoritarian secular state and its citizens in general.
Conducting interviews with elders is one of the most challenging issues in ethnographic
research, particularly in oral history studies during which you, as an oral historian, wish to docu-
ment narratives before they have severe illnesses or pass away. In our project, at times it was dif-
ficult to get elders’ life stories due to physical and psychological complications that they
endured as a result of senility. In her ethnographic work with elder women living during the
early decades of the Republic, Fatma Barbarosoglu also talks about the difficulty of interviewing
aged interlocutors with memory loss and senility.61 When we were informed by one of our con-
tacts that there was an old lady named M€uzeyyen in her nineties who witnessed many events in
that era in Fatih district of Istanbul, we immediately set out in search of her and located a con-
tact person to bring us to her house. When one of our female researchers in the team met
M€uzeyyen, she was sad to find out that M€uzeyyen could not speak due to a recent severe illness
of mental deterioration.62
It is a fact that such a project should have been conducted one or two decades ago. We had
difficulty in locating survivors and witnesses of the Mustafa Kemal era (1923–1938) while getting
in contact with survivors of the _In€on€u era (1938–1950). Among our 140 interviewees, just three
of them were witnesses of the 1920s, but they hardly remembered the events. We have actually
reached a number of elders who could be key interviewees, but most of them were either sick,
suffering memory loss or Alzheimer’s. Therefore, one realizes that beyond the politics of
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remembering and forgetting, and the inaccessibility of state archives, many untold stories, testi-
monies and memories of the era of single-party regime have been lost.
The protective laws and official archives
The task of undertaking an ethnography and oral history of the single-party regime, which has
been a taboo in Turkey, could be achieved through the application of oral accounts and testimo-
nies and the complementary support of the state archives as well. However, as Gavin Brockett
has stated, ‘historical analysis of the Atat€urk era is indeed limited by the inaccessibility of state
archives’ but then he adds ‘newspapers, population censuses and British consular documents all
constitute important sources for social history’ of that era.63 Brockett tried to overcome the limit-
edness of the sources and the inaccessibility of archives by using newspapers, printed docu-
ments and other written sources in his work. On the other hand, the state-legislated protective
laws of lese-majeste64 of the founding father Mustafa Kemal Atat€urk have restrained the focus
on his era. Furthermore, the fabricated perception of him and his ruling era as infallible and
untouchable has hampered the emergence of critical academic approaches to the social and pol-
itical history of that era in Turkey. While writing on the making of Atat€urk as a father figure of
the nation through art and propaganda in the early decades of the Republic, Faik Gur states that
‘by the time Atat€urk died in 1938, hundreds of busts, statues and monuments of him had already
been erected in most important public spaces in _Istanbul, Ankara and other major cities in
Turkey’.65 The labor of glorification of the father figure intensified in later periods and resulted in
the ornamentation of every single school (kindergarten, primary, secondary and high schools)
and all classrooms, official buildings, main squares of settlements (towns, counties, cities) which
were generally named ‘Cumhuriyet Meydanı’ (Republican Square), and even shops and restau-
rants with pictures, busts and monuments of Atat€urk. The veneration of the Atat€urk era and the
representation of Mustafa Kemal as a sacred and immortal figure for decades resulted in mute-
ness and the silencing of critical voices of survivors of that era, and following generations as
well.66 Here, it is crucial to note that this Kemalist narrative of Mustafa Kemal and glorification of
his era as a state-sponsored and manufactured narrative has been also promoted by some histor-
ians and other researchers working on the modern history of Turkey.67 However, as our oral his-
tory study has revealed, this narrative has not been shared by mass populations in the country.
On the other hand, the use of state archives particularly relating to certain periods in the
modern history of Turkey has been highly limited for researchers. In the context of the use and
abuse of archives and their role in reshaping our sense of history and the past, Meltem Ahıska
addresses the question of accessibility of the state archives with a particular focus on the rela-
tionships between history, memory, power and truth while writing on the destruction of archives
and the fear of archiving from the late Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic.68 In her
research, Ahıska delves into the question of publicizing past records of old totalitarian regimes
and points out that archives could possibly be ‘sites of destruction, falsification and corruption’
for the state which has an interest in making certain fabrications in the present.69 In this context,
let us think about accessibility to the Archive of the General Directorate of Police in Ankara,
which has an enormous amount of recorded information on secular politics along with docu-
mentation of executions, incarcerations, punishments and detentions carried by the state forces
(either police or gendarmerie).
It is a fact that state officials have not allowed any researchers to have full access to the
archives of the police department which are crucial for our project. However, we have made use
of a valuable little chunk of data presented through the work of Ali Dikici, who seems to be a
former police commissioner. In his work on secular regulations, laws and practices during the
rule of _Ismet _In€on€u, he documents detailed information on surveillance, arrests and punishments
of citizens who secretly practiced the teachings of the Quran in their houses, basements, barns
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or in the mosques. Dikici unveils recorded information, drawn from police records, about
arrested Muslims subjects who called for prayer in Arabic or wore the Fez instead of the Western
hat, or wore the hijab (çarşaf) and how they were dragged into the detention centers.70 So, as
Ahıska highlighted, the archives of the police department were partially used by Dikici for the
interest of the state to legitimize the secular state policies of the _In€on€u era. Dikici disagrees with
the arguments that secular policies were employed to erase Islam from state institutions and the
public space and keep Islam under control.71 Contrary to this argument, Dikici as a member of
the police department, claims that the rules and policies of the National Chief, _Ismet _In€on€u,
aimed to maintain, protect and ingrain Mustafa Kemal’s revolutions in society, a view echoing
the statist discourses of Kemal Karpat.72 Going beyond these arguments and Dikici’s use of police
archives allows us to learn a little bit about the state’s maltreatments of its citizens in that era in
spite of his statist rhetoric and Kemalist standpoint. What Dikici documents from the police
archives corresponds with what elders narrated to us in our oral history project. Therefore, the
stories and testimonies of state-sponsored executions and other atrocities from that era can be
interpreted as cultural ‘memoricide’73 and an erasure of Islamic cultural forms and traditions.
In summary, the inaccessibility of the state archives and fear of the state have made the task
of documenting the memories of that era and making them accessible and public a very difficult
one. Besides, the accomplishment of such research requires the witnesses, including the second
generation, to be willing to speak. Today, the archives of the state institutions such as the police
or the army are either still undisclosed or only partially accessible but restricted to certain
‘selected’ profiles of researchers. Therefore, doing research on ‘sensitive issues’ related to the mod-
ern history of the Turkish nation-state has been a very challenging one with many complexities.
Conclusion
The Eurocentric view of the world which is shaped by a series of orientalist, secularist, evolution-
ist and positivist ideas was entirely articulated within the statist and Kemalist discourse during
the single-party regime era by the Turkish secular elites. The rest of society was predominantly
perceived to be located on the ladder of development, and in need of being modernized and
civilized through different ideological and institutional state apparatuses by any means neces-
sary. Ordinary Muslim citizens were often described and presented as backwards, uncivilized
(gayri medeni) and a threat to the ideal principles of the authoritarian secular Republic.
Therefore, life stories and testimonies of ordinary people from the era of the single-party regime
not only document the resistance, resilience and struggle of mass populations but also how the
new authoritarian regime severely changed their social, cultural and economic life on both the
individual and collective levels. In other words, their testimonies signify their survival strategies
against the state-sponsored war on Islamic and traditional ways of life as they were historically
embodied in certain practices, institutions and cultural patterns. Therefore, the reactions and
resistance of Muslim subjects can be interpreted as acts of strong will and faith to protect and
maintain their sense of belonging and memory to the Ottoman-Islamic past and in a larger sense
to Islamic civilization.
In Turkey, studying the single-party regime era still remains one of the challenging fields with
methodological obstacles and political controversies. The histories, experiences and testimonies
of the silent Muslim populations were not only ‘too often neglected by an elite-oriented histori-
ography’74 but also ignored by critical researchers who escaped from possible severe consequen-
ces of the task of ‘brushing history against the grain’.75 Recent oral history research among
Turkish people carried out in the western part of the country in the Turkish populated cities
revealed the fact that ordinary Muslim Turkish subjects share a similar and even more traumatic
experience of the fear of the state concerning the single-party regime relevant to the fears of
other marginalized ethnic, religious and ideological communities in the country. In short, oral
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history sources tell us more about diverse forms of relations between the state and Islam
(Muslims) and how Islamic notions, cultural forms, codes and meanings were gradually prohib-
ited and eradicated from inside state institutions and public domains. Going beyond the politics
of the use and abuse of state archives and their (in)accessibility, oral history seems to become
the most influential methodology to use for not only unveiling memories of the politics and
practices of the authoritarian modern secular state but also deconstruction of the statist and
Kemalist discourses on the history of modern Turkey.
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L. Neyzi, ‘Oral History and Memory Studies in Turkey’, in C. Kerslake, K. €Oktem and P. Robins (eds), Turkey’s
Engagement with Modernity: Conflict and Change in the Twentieth Century (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2010), pp.443–59; M. Ahıska, ‘Occidentalism and Registers of Truth: Politics of Archives in Turkey’, New
Perspectives on Turkey Vol.34 (2006), pp.9–29; M. Ahıska, ‘Arşiv Korkusu ve Karakaplı Nizami Bey: T€urkiye’de
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Independence Tribunals and the Courts of the Hat Revolution in Sivas] (Istanbul: €Ot€uken Yayınları, 2011); M.C.
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